In an enlightening dialogue with Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Gadamer, Professor Seifert argues that the original inspiration of phenomenology was nothing other than the primordial insight of philosophy itself, the foundation of philosophia perennis . His radical rethinking of the phenomenological method results in a universal, objectivist philosophy in direct continuity with Plato, Aristotle and Augustine. In order to validate the classical claim to know autonomous being, the author defends Husserl's methodological principle "Back to things themselves" from empiricist and (...) idealist critics, including the later Husserl, and replies to the arguments of Kant which attempt to discredit the knowability of things in themselves. Originally published in 1982, this book culminates in a phenomenological and critical unfolding of the Augustinian cogito , as giving access to immutable truth about necessary essences and the real existence of personal being. (shrink)

In an enlightening dialogue with Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Gadamer, Professor Seifert argues that the original inspiration of phenomenology was nothing other than the primordial insight of philosophy itself, the foundation of philosophia perennis. His radical rethinking of the phenomenological method results in a universal, objectivist philosophy in direct continuity with Plato, Aristotle and Augustine. In order to validate the classical claim to know autonomous being, the author defends Husserl's methodological principle "Back to things themselves" from empiricist and idealist (...) critics, including the later Husserl, and replies to the arguments of Kant which attempt to discredit the knowability of things in themselves. Originally published in 1982, this book culminates in a phenomenological and critical unfolding of the Augustinian cogito, as giving access to immutable truth about necessary essences and the real existence of personal being. (shrink)

Die demografische Entwicklung und der medizinische Fortschritt werden die Problematik der Ressourcenknappheit im Gesundheitswesen in Zukunft weiter verschärfen. Auch Deutschland steht eine Prioritätensetzung im Gesundheitswesen bevor. Diese sollte in möglichst transparenter Weise nach klaren Kriterien erfolgen. Ein nur selten in diesem Kontext besprochenes Kriterium der Verteilung von Mitteln in der Gesundheitsversorgung ist die marginale Wirksamkeit medizinischer Leistungen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird dieses Kriterium vorgestellt und auf seine Fairness hin untersucht. Nach der kritischen Diskussion einiger Argumente gegen den offenen Einsatz von (...) Rationierungskriterien und einer Definition von marginaler Wirksamkeit in zwei unterschiedlichen Dimensionen werden verschiedene Vorzüge und eventuelle Nachteile des Kriteriums beleuchtet. (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)

Ingarden distinguishes four strata making up the structure of the literary work of art: the stratum of word sounds and sound-complexes; the stratum of meaning units; the stratum of represented objectivities (characters, actions, settings, and so forth); and the stratum of schematized aspects (perspectives under which the represented objectivities are given to the reader). It is not only works of literature which manifest this four-fold structure but also certain borderline cases such as newspaper articles, scientific works, biographies, and so forth. (...) Ingarden specifies what is characteristic of a work of literature by asserting that all declarative sentences appearing in the stratum of meaning units of such work possess what he calls a quasi-judgmental character. We discuss here Ingarden’s theory of quasi-judgments and draw out its implication that all works of literature are works of fiction through and through. (shrink)

Der Ausdruck Phänomenologie ist heute höchst vieldeutig geworden. Husserl hat seit 1905 eine immer stärkere Wendung zum Idealismus kantischer Prägung hin vollzogen, durch die er den Boden der Phänomenologie, wie er sie begründet hatte, verlassen hat. Eine ähnliche Abweichung von der ursprünglichen Idee der Phänomenologie findet sich bei vielen anderen "Phänomenologen." Die "realistische Phänomenologie", deren Vorläufer von Platon an und Klassiker von Husserl bis Schwarz in dieser ersten umfangreichen deutschsprachigen Anthologie zu Wort kommen, ist kein System, sondern eine Anwendung der (...) philosophischen Urmethoden, wie sie alle großen Philosophen tatsächlich anwandten, wenn sie ihre entscheidenden Entdeckungen machten. Mögen auch von Philosophen generell andere Methoden bewußt zugrunde gelegt werden, in dem Moment, in dem diese Einsichten gewonnen werden, liegt tatsächlich zu allen Zeiten jener letzte, fruchtbare Kontakt mit "den Sachen selbst" vor, der den Sinn der phänomenologischen Methode ausmacht, wie sie von den Meistern der realistischen Phänomenologie nur bewußter und systematischer angewandt wird als von vielen früheren Denkern. Nichts wäre darum irriger als in der phänomenologischen Betrachtungsweise eine Reduktion der Welt auf bloße "Phänomene" zu erblicken oder gar eine bloße Deskription der "Erscheinung" der Dinge. Zwischen phänomenologischer Betrachtungsweise und metaphysischer Wesensanalyse besteht kein Unterschied oder gar Gegensatz. (shrink)

This book makes four bold claims: 1) life is an ultimate datum, open to philosophical analysis and irreducible to physical reality; hence all materialist-reductionist explanations - most current theories - of life are false. 2) All life presupposes soul (_entelechy_) without which a being would at best _fake_ life. 3) The concept of life is _analogous_ and the most direct access to life in its irreducibility is gained through consciousness; 4) All life possesses an objective and intrinsic value that needs (...) to be respected, human life possesses beyond this an inviolable dignity. Life and personal life are pure perfections, it being absolutely better to possess (personal) life than not to possess it. Chapter 1: the metaphysical essence and the many meanings of 'life,' as well as its 'transcendental' character. Chapter 2: the irreducibility of _biological life_, its amazing empirical and philosophically intelligible essential features, and the ways of knowing them. Chapter 3: the immediate evidence and indubitable givenness of mental, conscious life as well as questions of (brain-) death and immortality. Chapter 4: the inviolable objective dignity of personal life and its self-transcendence; a new theory of the fourfold source of human dignity and rights. Chapter 5 (in dialogue-form): methods and results of philosophy versus those of empirical life-sciences. (shrink)

Libet considers “positive free voluntary acts” as mere illusions, admitting free will only as Veto. This essay shows seven ways by which we can gain evident knowledge about positive and negative free will, through: (1) the immediate evidence of free will in the cogito, (2) the light of the necessary essence of free will, (3) the experience of moral “oughts” in whose experience freedom is co-given, (4) any denial of human free will entails its assertion or recognition, (5) the objects (...) and subjects of certain acts disclose free will, (6) in a world without free agents there would be no explanation of the beginning of efficient causality, and (7) Veto-power of the will logically presupposes positive free will. Libet’s experiments confirm that the free decision to act at a certain time and the preceding and accompanying free acts make new energy to burst forth in the brain. (shrink)

Este estudo tem por objeto a filosofia scotista dos transcendentais, em especial a filosofia dos transcendentais como “perfeições puras”. Isso levará a uma consideração particular da “liberdade” como uma perfeição pura, bem como à concepção de um novo conceito de amor, não presente no eudemonismo aristotélicotomístico. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Duns Scotus. Filosofia dos transcendentais. Perfeições puras. Liberdade. Amor. Crítica ao eudemonismo. ABSTRACT The object of this study is Scotus’s philosophy of the transcendentals, particularly the philosophy of the transcendentals as “pure perfections”. (...) That will bring into a special consideration of “freedom” as a pure perfection, as well as into the formulation of a new concept of love, not to be found in the Aristotelian-Thomistic eudaimonism. KEY WORDS – Duns Scotus. Philosophy of the transcendentals. Pure perfections. Freedom. Love. Critique on eudaimonism. (shrink)

La cuestión de cuántas categorías hay y cuáles son depende de otra más esencial, la de saber cuál es la naturaleza de las categorías. A su vez, la respuesta a esta cuestión exige distinguir con claridad las categorías ontológicas de los transcendentales, de los modos de ser y de las categorías lógicas y las lingüísticas. Solo tras haber trazado estas distinciones, el autor esboza una respuesta a la pregunta de cuál es el número de las categorías.

The term "method" of realist phenomenology and philosophy can refer to three kinds of things which are being explored extensively in this work: (1) Kinds of philosophical knowledge used to return to things themselves: intellectual "vision" of necessary intelligible essences, insights into necessary states of affairs, knowledge of less than necessary essences, knowledge of existence as such, of the ego cogitans and of a concretely existing world, other persons, and the absolute being, deductive forms of reasoning, and others. (2) Ways (...) to achieve such knowledge: such as various types of distinctions, asking proper questions, correct use of analogies, and replies to objections. (3) Finally, these methods include several "tricks" and devices such as methodic doubt and epoché; these are subordinated to the other methods, and neither necessary nor universal tools of all philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

Der Streit um die Wahrheit richtet sich vor allem gegen die Fassung der Urteilswahrheit als einer "Übereinstimmung mit den Sachen". Eine kritische Analyse der Einwände verschiedenster alternativer Wahrheitstheorien (Evidenztheorie, Kohärenztheorie, Konsens- und Diskurstheorie, pragmatische Wahrheitstheorien, existentialistisch-heideggerianische, Jasper'sche, wittgensteinianische und andere) überwindet die Einwände gegen die klassische Korrespondenztheorie durch einen vertieften Begriff des Sachverhalts. Auch in der Verteidigung der Korrespondenztheorie durch Tarski, Popper, Albert und andere neuere Verfechter müssen diverse Mängel überwunden werden, um zu erkennen, daß sich jene schlichte Urgegebenheit der (...) Urteilswahrheit aus keinem Teilbereich der nicht-formalisierten Sprache und des unermeßlichen Reiches des Seins, ja nicht einmal aus der Sphäre des Nichts verdrängen oder durch etwas von Korrespondenz (Adäquatio) Verschiedenes ersetzen läßt. (shrink)

In the ontological argument and the method of Anselm, we find many phenomenological elements. The proximity of the ontological argument to phenomenology shows itself especially from a parallel between Anselm's and Husserl's deriving a necessity of thinking from a necessity of being. But, Medieval proofs for the existence of God appear to contradict the principles of phenomenological method, particularly the 'bodily self-givenness,' the epoché as bracketing the real existence as well as the transcendence of essence vis-àvis consciousness. The phenomenological method (...) must indeed be rethought and reformulated to allow a transition from returning to 'things themselves' to a philosophical knowledge of God. It must be freed from Husserl's subjectivistic theory of 'constitution' and from any generalization of the methodological principle of epoché. In this way, Anselm's position contains the germ for a critical rethinking of the phenomenological method in the vein of realist phenomenology. (shrink)

Hildebrand oftentimes said that his disciples—even when they believed they were deeply indebted to him for knowledge, wisdom, and truth—had a duty to criticize and overcome any error they would find in his philosophy, because the sole purpose of his writings was to state the truth. He himself gave some extraordinary examples of self-critique. In the following, I wish to treat such an example: a significant error about the nature of the free volitional response, which Stephen Schwarz was the first (...) to note and which Hildebrand himself later explicitly revoked. Furthermore, I wish to show that Hildebrand’s rejecting this error makes his ethics as a whole much more consistent, and opens the way to bringing his philosophy of love closer to our experience. (shrink)

Hildebrand oftentimes said that his disciples—even when they believed they were deeply indebted to him for knowledge, wisdom, and truth—had a duty to criticize and overcome any error they would find in his philosophy, because the sole purpose of his writings was to state the truth. He himself gave some extraordinary examples of self-critique. In the following, I wish to treat such an example: a significant error about the nature of the free volitional response, which Stephen Schwarz was the first (...) to note and which Hildebrand himself later explicitly revoked. Furthermore, I wish to show that Hildebrand’s rejecting this error makes his ethics as a whole much more consistent, and opens the way to bringing his philosophy of love closer to our experience. (shrink)